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BETWEEN A ROCK OF UNCERTAINTY AND A HARD CASE 
 
In Zurich Insurance PLC v International Energy Group Ltd [2015] UKSC 33; , seven Supreme Court 
Justices considered a number of issues created by the special causal rule developed in Fairchild v 
Glenhaven Funeral Services ([2003] 1 A.C. 32).  IEG is a solvent gas supply company, based in 
Guernsey, whose predecessor in title, Guernsey Gas Light Co Ltd (GGLCL), was responsible for 
exposing Mr Carré to asbestos dust at a consistent level throughout his 27 year period of 
employment, under circumstances which amounted to a breach of GGLCL’s duty.  When Mr 
Carré subsequently developed mesothelioma, therefore, IEG settled his claim on the basis of its 
predecessor having materially increased his risk of developing that disease, relying on the 
exceptional departure from the but for test now associated with Fairchild.  The settlement consisted 
of a compensation payment of £250,000 in damages and interest plus £15,300 towards Mr Carré’s 
costs.  In addition, IEG incurred defence costs of £13, 151.60. 
The difficulties in Zurich stem from the fact that GGLCL had only had liability insurance for eight 
of the 27 years during which Mr Carré had been exposed to asbestos (employers’ liability insurance 
was not compulsory in Guernsey until 1993).  Two of those eight years had been with the Excess 
Insurance Co Ltd and six with Midland Assurance Ltd, to whose liabilities Zurich had succeeded.  
Zurich initially offered to meet 72/326ths of the damages and interest paid, and of the defence 
costs incurred, calculated to represent the six out of 27 years of exposure during which Midland 
had been on risk.  At trial, Cooke J accepted Zurich’s argument as to its purported share of 
compensation, but ordered it to pay 100% of the defence costs.  The Court of Appeal allowed 
IEG’s appeal, rejected Zurich’s cross-appeal and ordered the latter to pay 100% of both the 
compensation paid, and the costs incurred by, IEG.   
The two principal issues to be considered by the Supreme Court were: 
1) Does Barker v Corus remain a valid common law rule following the enactment of the 
Compensation Act 2006 so that, where the Compensation Act does not apply, each 
defendant’s liability will be apportioned according to the period of time during which it 
exposed the claimant to asbestos? 
2) In any event, in situations to which Barker does not apply (either because it no longer 
represents the common law position, or because the Compensation Act 2006 applies), 
meaning that the defendant is liable for the whole of the claimant’s loss, is an insurer who 
was on risk for only part of the period of exposure also liable for the whole loss? 
3) Is such an insurer liable for the whole of the insured’s defence costs? 
Whilst the relevance of all of these issues is obvious for Guernsey, where the Compensation Act 
2006 does not apply, the significance to the UK of the second point in particular, is considerable.  
The initial Supreme Court hearing, in front of five Justices, led to a rehearing in front of seven:  
Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed, Lord Carnwath and Lord 
Hodge.  The Court was in agreement on the first and final points: 
This court is unanimously of the view that section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006 did 
not change the common law, which the House of Lords had laid down in Barker v Corus 
UK Ltd [2006] 2 AC 572, but overrode it only to the extent that the section provides.  The 
court also holds, unanimously, that the appeals fails on the issue of defence costs. (Lord 
Hodge at [100]). 
  
Barker established that, where the special rule in Fairchild applies to establish liability, defendants’ 
liability would be apportioned according to the relative periods of time during which they had 
exposed claimants to asbestos.  The effect of recognising that it still represents the common law 
position, therefore, was to establish that Zurich’s liability to IEG would be correspondingly 
proportionate to the six out of 27 years during which the latter was exposed to asbestos.  This 
point was accepted by all parties and is, according to Lord Mance (at [26]), “a corollary of the 
fundamental principle of indemnity, which governs liability insurance”.  
The issue with regard to defence costs was briefly dispatched by the Court as a whole, on the 
premise that the insurance contracts covered defence costs on a straightforward causative basis, 
and since the extent of those costs was in no way affected by whether the claim covered six or 27 
years, there was no basis on which they should or could be prorated (see Lord Mance at [94)].  It 
is the second question outlined above which divided the Court.  As Lord Neuberger and Lord 
Reed, (agreeing with Lord Sumption) identified at [200], there exist three conceivable solutions to 
this question.   
The first is the one that had been adopted by the Court of Appeal.  On its view, (having decided 
that Barker was no longer good law), it held that any insurer on risk for any of the periods during 
which an insured exposed its employee to asbestos would be liable for the entire loss, with no 
allowance made for periods when the risk lay elsewhere.  Both Toulson LJ and Aikens LJ reasoned 
that such an outcome was the inevitable result of Durham v BAI (Run off) Ltd ([2012] UKSC 14; 
[2012] 1 W.L.R. 867 (the Trigger Litigation)), in which the Supreme Court deemed that, in cases 
engaging the special rule in Fairchild, an insurer’s liability is triggered by any period of exposure 
during which it was on risk.  This interpretation of Trigger, which was the position argued for by 
IEG, equates the relationship between the employer and employee with the relationship between 
an insured and an insurer:  since employers will be liable in full under the special rule if they 
wrongfully exposed their employee to asbestos at any time, the same should be true of any insurer 
on risk during any period of exposure.  This was an approach which no member of the Supreme 
Court was willing to accept. 
The second possible solution is that taken by a majority of the Supreme Court.  In giving the 
leading judgment, with which Lord Clarke, Lord Carnwath and Lord Hodge agreed, Lord Mance 
considered that Zurich should be “answerable in the first instance for IEG’s liability towards Mr 
Carré” but that the Court should go on to recognise “an equity, based on consideration of the 
wider circumstances – in particular GGLCL/IEG’s exposure of Mr Carré for further periods when 
it was not insured by Midland – requiring IEG itself to contribute towards Zurich’s costs of 
meeting such liability.” At [72].  This approach, according to Lord Hodge (at [110]) and Lord 
Sumption (at [119]) accords with that already adopted in practice by the London insurance market 
in the wake of Fairchild, whereby insurers, having paid out on any policy on which they are on risk, 
then seek contribution from other insurers with the same contractual exposure.  The consequence 
of the majority decision in Zurich is to treat insureds in the same way; liable to contribute for 
periods during which they had no external cover, acting effectively during those periods as self-
insurers. Lord Hodge nevertheless deemed it to be the “more radical” of the two approaches 
identified by the Supreme Court (at [101]).   
The third and final approach is that proposed in the dissenting judgment of Lord Sumption, with 
whom Lord Neuberger and Lord Reed agreed.  This was to recognise that any insurer who had 
not been on risk for the whole of the relevant period was not answerable in the first instance for 
the whole of the loss, but only ever to be liable on a prorated basis (this, despite the fact that all 
  
parties had accepted that the result would always begin with an insurer being answerable in full; 
see Lord Mance at [9]).  Lord Sumption’s method is founded expressly on a contractual basis: 
 “The liabilities of an insurer are wholly contractual.  The answer to the questions now 
before the court necessarily depend on the construction of the contract and on nothing 
else…The suggestion that some doctrine of law can be devised which imposes on an 
insurer in one year the risk that insurers of other years may become insolvent, or that in 
other years the employer may fail to insure at all, is both unprincipled and unjust.  The 
suggestion that equity can partially adjust the result of this injustice by requiring the insured 
to repay to the insurer part of the insurance moneys which the latter was contractually 
obliged to pay him, is contrary to basic principles of law.” At [113]. 
The approach of the majority, by contrast, was clearly one viewed through the lens of tort law, as 
fashioned by Fairchild, Barker, the Compensation Act 2006 and the Trigger litigation: 
“…it is consistent with the policy of the United Kingdom Parliament that the employee-
victim should be able to obtain damages for his loss in a straightforward way.”  Lord 
Hodge at [106]. 
But what is sauce for the wrongdoing goose is not necessarily sauce for the prudently reckoning 
gander.  Tort and contract are rarely normatively commensurable.  The special rule in Fairchild was 
crafted to address a very specific moral quandary.  Had it not been developed in that case (from its 
original incarnation in McGhee v National Coal Board ([1973] 1 W.L.R. 1)), the House of Lords would 
have allowed employers to enjoy an effective immunity whenever more than one of them had 
exposed to asbestos an employee who later contracted mesothelioma.  In corrective justice terms, 
this was a stark choice indeed:  the state of medical knowledge about the aetiology of mesothelioma 
is such that, where the asbestos which triggers it comes from multiple sources, any claimant will in 
principle not be able to prove his case on the balance of probabilities.  The asbestos-mesothelioma 
cases are neither difficult, nor hard.  They are, when subject to orthodox rules, impossible.  There 
is no doubt, therefore, that the special rule, allowing such claimants to establish causation so long 
as they can prove that that any defendant materially increased the risk of their developing 
mesothelioma, was a desperate measure.  It is defensible only on the basis that it redressed what 
would otherwise have amounted to a systemic injustice between duty-breaching, profit-seeking 
employers and the employees to whom they externalised their risks.  As between an insured and 
an insurer, there is no such inherent imbalance, moral or otherwise.   
To fail to heed to this distinction is, however, to create just such an imbalance.  As Lord Mance 
points out (at [78]), where the insured is solvent, as was the case in Zurich itself, there will be little 
practical difference between the approach of the majority and that advocated by Lord Sumption.  
The implications of the majority decision, however, are that the risks of both insurer insolvency 
and an absence of insurance will be borne by any solvent insurer who was on risk at any time during 
the relevant period.  This “entirely severs the functional connection between premiums and risk” 
(Lord Sumption at [155]).  Section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006 declares liability imposed 
under the rule in Fairchild to be joint and several in any case involving asbestos and mesothelioma.  
The combined effect of this and the special rule in Fairchild, described by Lord Phillips in Sienkiewicz 
v Grief ([2011] UKSC 10; [2011] 2 A.C. 229 at [58]) as “draconian”, is to impose a double risk on 
any defendant:  the risk that it might be held liable despite having made no difference to the 
claimant’s position, and the risk that, if all other defendants are insolvent or non-existent, that it 
will be liable for the claimant’s full damages with no opportunity to seek contribution.  For reasons 
already outlined, this evil is lesser than its alternative, which would be to impose instead the same 
  
double risk on an injured claimant.  To follow the majority model in Zurich, however, is to impose 
a similarly onerous double risk on insurers.  Given that “[i]nsurers are not wrongdoers” (Lord 
Sumption at [157]), this imposition lacks the moral justification which could be offered in support 
of the special causal rule and its statutory companion.   
Nevertheless, that same moral justification is the one which appears to have had some bearing on 
the outcome in Zurich.  Maximising the chances of mesothelioma claimants being able to recover 
their damages in full is the clear combined aim of section 3 Compensation Act, the Trigger litigation 
and the Mesothelioma Act 2014 (the latter of which provides for a scheme from which workplace 
mesothelioma victims can be paid in the event that they are unable to bring an action against any 
employer or insurer – see Lord Mance at [6] and Lord Sumption at [172]).  The majority in Zurich 
regarded this as a basis for maximising a claimant’s protection from the risk of insolvency insofar 
as the law is able to do: 
“…it is consistent with the United Kingdom Parliament that the employee-victim should 
be able to obtain damages for his loss in a straightforward way” (Lord Hodge at [106]). 
Indeed, at [108], Lord Hodge goes as far as to say that pro rata liability on the part of insurers 
would be inconsistent with the decision in the Trigger litigation.  The eponymous point in Trigger, 
however, is the crucial one: insurers on risk for industrial illnesses and injuries should not be able 
to avoid liability for mesothelioma because of the uncertainty as to when precisely the disease was 
triggered.  In that case, the court was concerned to avoid a situation in which the special rule carved 
out in Fairchild would be stripped of any practical effect by the wording commonly employed in 
employer insurance contracts: 
“It is inappropriate for the common law to redefine liabilities so that they are not 
susceptible to being insured by policies already in place, and then to call the result 
principled.” (R.Merkin and J.Steele, Insurance and the Law of Obligations (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2013), at p. 364) 
But this, a decision preventing insurers from relying on semantics to make a particular risk 
uninsurable, does not lead logically or legally to a conclusion that they should therefore be liable 
during periods when they are not on risk. Liability imposed on the basis of the special rule in 
Fairchild is calibrated by risk:  whilst the disease itself is the gist of the claim, risk is the retrospective 
means by which liability is imposed, because it is the only way in which liability can be imposed.  It 
does not follow from this that mesothelioma is caused by every period of exposure.  In fact, were 
that to be the implication of Fairchild, it would have created nothing exceptional at all, since that is 
also the implication of the orthodox material contribution to injury situation illustrated by Bonnington 
Castings v Wardlaw ([1956] A.C. 613), which was deemed to be inapplicable in Fairchild.  The crucial 
difference between the orthodox and exceptional rules is the “rock of uncertainty”; any case of 
mesothelioma might be caused by a given period of exposure and no other, but it might also be 
caused by several, or all, periods of exposure.  This is why liability under the special rule is based 
on a given defendant’s material contribution to a homogeneous risk.  If an insured is liable for 
contributing to such a risk, it is not clear why its insurance policy should be interpreted as if it were 
solely responsible for causing the injury itself.   
There is general recognition that the special rule developed in Fairchild has generated shockwaves 
throughout the law of negligence, a state of affairs described in Zurich as “a sort of juridical version 
of chaos theory” (Lord Neuberger and Lord Reed at [191]).  There is very good reason, therefore, 
to prevent those distorting effects from spreading further.  This is particularly so where that spread 
  
threatens to affect the law of contract and the principle of certainty which it holds so dear.  In the 
specific context of insurance contracts, there is also the very real danger that the next set of 
problems emanating from the special rule will relate to reinsurance and the matrix of cover at the 
next tier ‘up’.  It is only a matter of time before issues in contracts of insurance become issues in 
contracts of reinsurance.  English authorities, for instance, currently suggest that an insurer is not 
free “to maximise its recovery from reinsurers by manipulating allocation” of its risks across 
different years of cover (R.Merkin and J.Steele, Insurance and the Law of Obligations (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2013), at p. 380), but this is a point as ripe for challenge as it is liable to disrupt 
reinsurance practices.   
Whilst Zurich itself did not argue for the approach advocated by the minority, despite its obvious 
advantages for insurers, this could well be because “the insurance market may fear that, if the court 
adopts the solution favoured by Lord Sumption, Parliament will intervene as it did following 
Barker.” (at [203]).  There is evidence that the same concern had a bearing on the decision of the 
majority (see Lord Hodge at [106]).  As Burrows has pointed out, however: 
“To hold back a development on the basis of a chance that Parliament may intervene 
represents nothing less than an abdication of judicial responsibility.  Better it is for the 
courts to proceed knowing that, of course, the Legislature is always free to impose a 
statutory solution or amendment if the common law approach is thought unsatisfactory or 
incomplete.” ((2012) 128 L.Q.R. 232, at p. 248) 
The common law should certainly consider whether its “initiatives are in harmony with legislative 
policy expressed in statutes” (at [106]).  It is not obvious, however, that a legislative policy relating 
to negligence requires the courts to try and achieve harmony with it in a way which has inevitable 
implications for both insurance and contract law more generally.  In a negligence action, the 
claimant and defendant make up a single unit in corrective justice terms (A Beever, Rediscovering the 
Law of Negligence (Oxford, Hart, 2009), at p.214).  Insurers are not part of that unit, and, whilst they 
have an obvious role to play in ensuring that claimants’ rights can have practical corrective effect, 
they remain independent of the moral nexus which connects the parties to a negligence action.  
The tort of negligence is still dealing with the effects of an audacious departure from principle.  
Those effects should not be permitted to compound the erosion of principle across the common 
law. 
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